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A Solomon Islands national election was held on 
19 November 2014. SSGM mobilised observation 
teams in 12 constituencies, conducting voter 
surveys, observing campaigns and interviewing 
community leaders. Overall, the election was 
conducted in a very orderly manner. Voting in 
the constituency I observed (North Vella Lavella, 
Western Province) was conducted without any 
obvious intimidation or interference. Vote counting 
was procedurally impeccable. Electoral officials 
and police were highly professional in their 
conduct, and candidates’ scrutineers were included, 
appropriately, in a highly transparent process. 
Such procedural regularity, however, is no guide 
to the politics of the election. This In Brief reports 
on some of the more important observations made 
during the North Vella campaign and marks out 
some of the implications for understanding elector-
al politics and development in Solomon Islands. 
In North Vella, Milner Tozaka OBE, formerly a 
distinguished diplomat, first won the seat in 2006, 
and again, with a much increased vote, in 2010. In 
2014, he was favoured to win again. Tozaka had to 
beat three other candidates, but, as the incumbent, 
he had access to Rural Constituency Development 
Funds (RCDF). Additionally, his opponents were 
all based in Ward 9 (one of two wards of the elec-
torate), meaning that they would most likely split 
the vote in that ward between them, leaving Tozaka 
with the advantage in the more populous Ward 
10. Tozaka maintained effective networks across 
the electorate, particularly among United Church 
leaders and chiefs. His wife, Jenny, is the provincial 
member for Ward 10.
In the results, these expectations were vindicated: 
Tozaka won the seat with 43 per cent of the total 
valid vote, defeating Honiara businessman Jennings 
Movobule on 34 per cent. He is now Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and External Trade in the 
Democratic Coalition for Change Government, led 
by Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare. Tozaka’s 
appointment to this role signals Sogavare’s desire 
to have a closer relationship with the Australian 
Government than previously (cf. Dinnen 2008). 
The political system awards SBD6 million per 
annum (approximately AUD950,000) to each sit-
ting member of parliament (MP) as RCDF. These 
funds are disbursed at the discretion of the MP with 
little accountability for how the money is spent. 
Over time, increases in the RCDF paid to MPs has 
institutionalised a system of clientelism that has 
reshaped expectations of national development 
into forms that have adapted to the position and 
resources of political patrons (Cox 2009).
It was clear from our conversations and surveys 
that the disbursement of RCDF money influences 
the way people vote. This follows a familiar logic 
of reciprocity that has been widely documented in 
Solomon Islands and other parts of Melanesia (e.g. 
Morgan 2005). Yet, much as it is accepted as the 
norm by voters and politicians alike, this reciprocity 
of receiving gifts from political patrons and voting 
accordingly operates according to a profound 
inequality of power (Cox 2009). This is apparent 
in the petty nature of the RCDF disbursements: 
roofing iron, solar lights, water tanks and outboard 
motors were the most commonly reported 
‘projects’. All of these items are highly valued in 
North Vella, where there are few opportunities 
for people to earn cash income, but it is clear that 
they primarily benefit households. Some older 
informants lamented that these disbursements 
have become more individualistic. They recalled 
an earlier age when MPs funded community assets 
and did so in ways that were perceived as fairer and 
more equitable. Nevertheless, these gifts too were 
modest things like outboard motors. Tozaka had 
funded a boat and motor for one of the schools, 
but this seemed to have generated little political 
capital beyond the principal and teachers at the 
school. Other payments commonly reported to our 
team included school fees and, particularly around 
election time, small disbursements (typically 
SBD200–1,000) for travel and food. North Vella is a 
small electorate of 3,840 enrolled voters. It was not 
lost on some community members that these small-
scale benefits do not seem to match up with the 
generous SBD6 million per annum of RCDF. 
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Notably absent from the candidates’ campaigns 
was any discussion of the poor state of services in 
the constituency or the need for improved infra-
structure or other ‘bigger picture’ elements of eco-
nomic or social development. This is, perhaps, to 
be expected in a context where, historically, people 
have little experience of an effective state (Dinnen 
2008). The politics of this constituency turned on 
questions of distribution: should voters stick with 
their MP of two terms or look to an alternative? 
Who would make the better distributor of these 
household scale benefits? 
Criticism of Tozaka, heard from both supporters 
and competitors, centred on these petty disburse-
ments, particularly questions of favouritism and 
exclusion. Tozaka himself is widely believed to be 
a good man, highly educated and of honourable 
intentions (cf. Corbett and Wood 2013). There-
fore, criticism of his performance as a distributive 
politician was deflected to his ‘middle men’ — the 
network of village committees set up by the MP to 
determine who receives benefits and who does not. 
These committees are managed by two government 
staff — the constituency development officer and 
the project officer — but interactions at the local 
level are likely to be between individuals seeking 
assistance and members of the MP’s committee for 
each village. During election campaigns, middle 
men may also act as brokers who influence people’s 
votes on behalf of the MP (cf. Wood 2014). 
Many voters reported that middle men only 
allow RCDF funds to be spent on Tozaka supporters 
and that they actively exclude those known to 
support (or suspected of having voted for) political 
competitors. Some also explained that middle men 
were ‘ripping off ’ Tozaka, pretending to follow 
his instructions but actually keeping much of 
the money for themselves. It was not possible to 
investigate the veracity of these claims. However, 
the narrative itself suggests that people who think 
they are not benefitting from the political system 
blame local intermediaries, not distant and high-
status politicians. Nor do they critique the system 
itself. For most of our team’s informants (and even 
for members of the research team themselves), 
petty distributions were thoroughly naturalised as 
the core role of politicians, with performance in 
Parliament a secondary consideration. 
Petty disbursement is now deeply embedded in 
the political culture of Solomon Islands. As the pro-
portion of public funds going to RCDF increases, 
it seems likely to become further entrenched. This 
trend is at odds with the country’s deteriorating 
services, particularly in health. As donors consider 
how best to engage with the realities of politics in 
Solomon Islands, it is important to understand 
how the dynamics of clientelism play out at both 
local and national levels. Donors and civil society 
activists need to develop a critical appraisal of the 
implications for national development of a politi-
cal system where MPs engage with development 
in highly localised terms and where the electorate’s 
expectations of their MPs and of the role of the 
state in providing services are narrow, unambitious 
and usually uncontested. The ways that middle men 
may insulate political patrons from more direct crit-
icism from their constituents are as yet only dimly 
understood and require further investigation. 
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